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The
Supreme Court
and Private Schools:
An Update
NEAL DEVINS

F

the first time, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that states
may properly "conclude that there is a strong public interest in assuring
the continued financial health of private schools, both sectarian and nonsectarian." Consequently, many aid schemes benefiting private schools-and
heretofore thought unconstitutional-may in the future be upheld as constitutional.
T he Court espoused the virtues of private education in their July 1983 decision, Mueller v. Allen. Mueller upheld, in a 5 to 4 vote, a tuition tax-deduction scheme which permitted parents of Minnesota schoolchildren to deduct expenses incurred in providing "tuition, textbooks, and transportation"
for their children, whether they attend public or private schools. The statute
was challenged by Minnesota taxpayers who alleged that the tax deduction
provided unconstitutional state assistance to sectarian institutions.
T here are still some limitations, however, for the Court has also recognized
that private schools which violate "public policy" cannot receive government
largesse. The Court's words of caution were contained in the May 1983 Boh
Jones University v. United States decision. which held 8 to 1 that the taxexemption provision of the Internal Revenue Code does not extend to institutions whose practices are in violation of "fundamental public policy." The
university's religious-based practice of prohibiting interracial dating was
deemed contrary to the national policy of nondiscrimination. The university
was also unsuccessful in its contention that the Internal Revenue Service
could not enforce its policy against schools that engage in racial discrimination based upon "sincerely held religious belief."
. T aken together, Bob Jones University and Mueller represent a public-polley breakthrough for private education. Mainstream private education groups
SUch as the National Association of Independent Schools and the Council of
OR
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American Private Education support, and their member schools g ener al1
conform to, state regulations ensuring a quality education in a socially aeeep{.
able environment. This stance reflects these groups' concern that private
schools be recognized as beneficial and beneficent so that government will
provide fiscal assistance to private education. Such aid will in turn make private education an option available to more parents. Consequently, mainstream
private educators opposed Bob Jones University because that institution's
practices conveyed the image that private schools were havens for pare nts
of white school children fleeing from integration. Mainstream private-school
groups also supported the Minnesota tax-deduction program, not only because the statute conveyed a positive image of private education but also
because the Court's upholding of the statute removed another obstacle in the
way of government assistance to private schools.

New Aid for Old Schools
The Mue/ler v. Allell decision paves the way for expansive (or minuscule)
state aid programs that benefit private schools. In Mueller, the Court circu mscribed several 1970s decisions that had severely restricted state efforts to
assist private schools. At issue in Mueller was the constitutional provision
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,"
which applies to state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution.
Three values underlie this Establishment Clause: neutrality, religious accommodation, and separation. Neutrality reflects the belief that all religions
should be treated in a similar manner; that government should not extend
special benefits to impose special impediments on any religion. Religious
accommodation recognizes the inevitability of certain contacts between government and religion, as well as the propriety of some of these contacts
to encourage religious practice. Separation seeks to ensure "the integrity of
both church and state by prohibiting government from favoring religion over
irreligion or vice-versa.
To determine whether a statute is constitutional, the Supreme Court has
developed a three-part test: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; ... finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion." If any of these three elements is not satisfied, the statute will be found unconstitutional.
Supreme Court decisions intcrpreting this tripartite standard have been
mystifying. Since 1971, among the programs the Court has found unconstitutional are salary supplements for private-school teachers, service contracts
calling for the state to pay nonpublic schools for providing secular education,

TH E SUPREME COURT AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS: AN UPDATE

15

cash grants to schools for the costs of state-prepared and teacher-prepared
testing, tuition reimbursement and tax credits for low-income parents, grants
to schools for maintenance and repair, loans of instructional equipment and
materials to both private schools and private school pupils, and grants for
fiel d trip transportation. Yet the Court has also upheld a variety of aid
sche mes, including school bus transportation, textbook loans, real property
tax exemptions, (federal) construction grants for church-related colleges,
speech and hearing diagnostic services, medical services, neutral-site therapeu ti c services, programs for the handicapped, neutral-site guidance and
cou nseling, and direct grants to schools for the cost of state-mandated and
state-prepared tests.
Apparently the Court has recognized a certain inconsistency among these
decisions, noting "that the wall of separation that must be maintained between
church and state 'is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on
all the circumstances of particular relationship.' " In a similar vein, the Court
furt her noted that they can only "dimly perceive" the boundary between constitutional and unconstitutional aid. Therefore, although the tripartite test "is
well settled," in particular cases it resembles less a set formula than a "helpful signpost."
One clement of the tripartite test, however, is clear. If the government
program at issue is arguably nonreligious, the program will satisfy the secul ar purpose element of the tripartite test. In Committee for Public Edllcation v. Nyquist (1973), the Supreme Court noted:
[W]e do not doubt-indeed, we fully recognize-the validity of the State's interest in promoting pluralism and diversity among its public and nonpublic
schools. Nor do we hesitate to acknowledge the reality of its concern for an
already overburdened public school system that might suffer in the event that
a significant percentage of the children presently attending nonpublic schools
should abandon those schools in favor of the public schools.
In Mueller v. A lien, the Court elaborated on the reasons for this. Past govern ment aid to private schools was accepted because the motivations of the
respective states were not unconstitutional. "A state's decision to defray the
Cost of educational expenses incurred by parents," wrote the Court, "is both
secular and understandable."
Significantly more complicated than the question of secular purpose, howe~er, are those involving the secular effect and entanglement prongs of the
~Ipartite test. Mueller sheds little direct light on entanglement. According to
arvard law professor Laurence Tribe, entanglement occurs when government attempts to "insinuate itself coercively into rcligious life, by policing
the expenditure of public monies to assure, as the establishment clause itself
re .
qUIres, that such monies arc expended only for secular purposes." In M uel-
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ler, the "only plausible source" of entanglement was the state requirement
that their officials determine whether particular textbooks qualify for a de.
duction. Because the Supreme Court upheld similar procedures in its 1968
Board of Education v. Allen decision, the Mueller Court reasoned that the
"same result follows in this case."
The primary determination the Supreme Court made in Mueller Was
whether the Minnesota tax-deduction provision violated the secular effeet
provision of the Establishment Clause test by giving parents of private school
children disproportionate benefits. The deduction was limited to actual ex.
penses for "tuition, textbooks, and transportation" of all grade-school or high.
school children; a deduction could not exceed $500 per dependent in grades
K-6, and $700 per dependent in grades 7-12. Those challenging the statute
pointed to the fact "that for the school year 1978-1979 ... only 79 students
paid tuition for attendance at Minnesota public schools .... By contrast, the
number of school children attending nonpublic schools in Minnesota during
the 1979-1980 school year, was 90,954. Of these, 86,808 (95.44 percent)
attended schools considering themselves to be sectarian." Against this posi.
tion the state argued that the "expenses are quite varied and are, in fact, avail·
able to every taxpayer in the state of Minnesota whether that taxpayer's child
attends public or private school." The state of Minnesota went on to cite ten·
nis shoes, bus transportation, driver training tuition, summer school tu ition
and the like as examples of deductions open to all.

Who Benefits from Private Education?
Court decisions predating Mueller demonstrated the Justices' willingness
to look beyond the mere language of a statute to determine the actual ben·
eficiaries of a state assistance program. The "primary effect [of an enactment]
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion." In two 1973 Supreme Court decisions which invalidated state efforts to make the private education option more affordable, the Court ruled that only those laws wh ich
had "a remote and incidental effect advantageous to religious institutions"
could pass constitutional muster.
In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, the Court invalidated a
New York law allowing tax deductions for nonpublic-school tuition payments
gauged to the tax bracket of each taxpayer. Writing for the majority, Justice
Lewis Powell reasoned that "[b]y reimbursing parents for a portion of their
tuition bill, the state seeks to relieve their financial burdens sufficiently to assume that they continue to have the option to send their children to religiousoriented schools." It did not matter whether or not sectarian institutions actually received money from this; what mattered was that they benefited from
them. In the Sloan v. Lemon decision, issued the same day as Nyquist, the
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c ourt rendered unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute that partially reimbursed parents for nonpublic elementary and secondary school tuition. Following the Nyquist rationale, the Court noted that "we look to the substance
of the program, and no matter how it is characterized its effect remains the
same. The State has singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic
benefit. "
Nyquist and Sloan were considered especially significant since the Court
indicated that the state could not even indirectly assist predominantly sectarian private education through parental aid programs. In the 1971 Lemon
v. Kurtzman decision the Court concluded that the state could not directly
assist private schools if such aid granted the state "any direction, supervision
or control over the policy determination, personnel, curriculum, program of
instruction or any other aspect of the administration or operation of any nonpublic school." It thus appeared that only such nonideological aid as bus
transportation and textbooks could pass constitutional muster.
The rigid analysis utilized in Nyquist and Sloan was criticized for its shortsigh tedness. Chief Justice Warren Burger's dissent noted that the New York
an d Pennsylvania programs "merely attempt to ... [give] to parents of private school children, in the form of dollars or tax deductions, what the parents of public school children receive in kind. It is no more than simply equity
to grant partial relief to parents who support the public schools they do
not use." The Chief Justice argued that the New York and Pennsylvania programs actually fostered government neutrality towards religion by providing
all students a right to attend the school of their choice. A similar criticism
was levied at the Court by a Note in the Harvard Law Review:
[T]he overall effect of the government's school financing program ... with its
disincentives as well as incentives to private education . . . was not evaluated .
. . . By defining neutrality narrowly ... the Court perceived no conflict between
[two of the values which underlie the Establishment Clause, namely] neutrality
and separation. This narrow approach to neutrality made the Court's decision
appear consistent with both policies; the real conflict between separation and
neutrality was never squarely faced.
This is a crucial point. When the Court seeks to determine the "actual beneficiaries" of a state enactment, it looks narrowly to the effect of the enactment on private religious schools. Never do they address the issue of how such
laws affect public and nonpublic education as a whole. In other words, an
enactment whose marginal effect makes predominantly church-affiliated priVate education more affordable will be found unconstitutional under the NyqUist-Sloan view-regardless of whether the state could have constitutionally
created a school finance system similar to the one resulting from the new laws.
The Nyquist-Sloan standard was loosened somewhat in 1977 with Wolman
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v. Walter. In Wolman, the Court upheld those portions of an Ohio statute
authorizing expenditures of state funds for supplying nonpublic school students with textbooks, standardized testing and scoring services, on-site speech
and hearing diagnostic services, and neutral-site therapeutic and remedial services. At the same time, the Court invalidated those parts of the statute which
provided nonpublic schools with instructional materials and field trip services. To justify these seemingly inconsistent rulings, the Court concluded such
educational aid is acceptable if it is most likely that it "will only have secular value of legitimate interest to the State and doesn't present any appreciable risk of being used to aid transmission of religious views." The Wolm an
ruling, like Nyquist and Sloan, thus involved a judicial determination as to
the "actual effects" of a state aid program.
In Mueller v. Allen, the Supreme Court took an analytical leap of fai th
and refused to consider the actual effect of the Minnesota program. Justice
William Rehnquist, writing for the Court, contended: "We would be loath
to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on
annual reports reciting the extent to which various classes of private citizens
claimed benefits under the law." They justified this refusal to look at the actual beneficiaries of the Minnesota program by noting private- and publicschool parents could both take advantage of the tax-deduction program.1
Those statutes where the Court did look at actual effects involved state aid
programs available only to private schools and parents of private school chi ldren. The Mueller Court, however, did not adopt Chief Justice Burger's view
that the Court had been too short-sighted in looking only at the marginal effects of state-aid packages directed at private education. Instead, the Court
concluded that, since parents of both public and private school children could
participate in the program, the marginal effect of the Minnesota program was
presumptively secular. The possible significance of both public and private
school children participating in a state-aid program was noted by the Court
in its Nyquist opinion: "Allen [textbooks] and Everson [public transportation]
differ from the present litigation .... In [those] cases the class of beneficiaries
1 The Court also noted that the educational tax deduction was only one among many
tax deductions and other tax benefits granted by Minnesota. Minnesota law also allowed
deductions for medical expenses and contributions to religious institutions. Stressing
that the broad class of beneficiaries able to participate in the Minnesota program created a presumption of permissible "benevolent neutrality" towards religious institutions,
the Court noted "that traditionally 'legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating
classifications and distinctions in tax statutes,' in part because the 'familiarity with local
conditions' enjoyed by legislators especially enables them to 'achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burden.''' Criticizing this conclusion, Justice Marshall noted in dissent that" [i] t was precisely the substantive impact of the financial support, and not its
particular form, that rendered the programs in Nyquist and Sloan v. Lemon unconstitutional. "
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included all school children, those in public as well as those in private schools."
Yet, as Justice Thurgood Marshall's dissenting opinion pointed out, that "the
Minnesota statute makes some small benefit available to all parents cannot
alter the fact that the most substantial benefit provided by the statute is available only to those parents who send their children to schools that charge tuition." As the largest allowable deduction was for tuition, this break was only
for parents of private school children.

A New Look at Private Schools
The apparent doctrinal shift set out in Mueller is best attributed to the
Court's adoption of two new views of the state's relationship to private education. First, the Court rejected its earlier adopted position that "political
divisions on religious lines is one of the principal evils that the first amendment sought to forestall." Today, however, the danger of such evils is remote, "and when viewed against the positive contributions of sectarian
schools" seems an "entirely tolerable" risk.
Second, the Court in Mueller stressed the positive role private schools play
in our educational system:
Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have provided an
educational alternative for millions of young Americans; they often afford wholesome competition with our public schools; and in some States thcy relieve substantially the tax burden incident to the operation of public schools. The State
has, moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating education of the highest quality for all children within its boundaries, whatever school their parents choose
for them.

The Court boldly held that whatever inequality there was in the utilization
of such deductions was no more than a "rough return for the benefits ...
provided to the state and all taxpayers by parents sending their children to
parochial school."
This attitude is quite a shift from the 1975 Supreme Court decision Meek
v. Pittenger, which found unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute providing
"auxiliary services" (maps, charts, laboratory equipment) to nonpublic school
~hildren: "Even though earmarked for secular purposes, 'When it flows to an
mstitution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its
f~nctions are subsumed in the religious mission,' state aid has the impermisSible primary effect of advancing religion." This conclusion was predicated
on the Court's view that the real purpose of much sectarian education was
"the inculcation of religious values and belief." Indeed, a remarkable passage
~ontained in Justice William Douglas's concurring opinion in Lemon v.
urtzman reflects this same view:
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In the parochial schools Roman Catholic indoctrination is included in eVe
subject. History, literature, geography, civics, and science are given a Rom;
Catholic slant. The whole education of the child is filled with propaganda. Tha~
of course, is the very purpose of such schools, the very reason for going to ali
of the work and expense of maintaining a dual school system. Their purpose is
not so much to educate, but to indoctrinate and train, not to teach scripture
truths and Americanism, but to make loyal Roman Catholics. The children are
regimented, and are told what to wear, what to do, and what to think.
Those challenging the Minnesota scheme advanced this argument: "A strong
public education system is essential to the continued success of our democratic
society .... Continuing efforts to divert revenues from public elementary and
secondary schools is cause for alarm .... [D]iverting revenue from public
education to support nonpublic, primarily religious school is not only detrimental to our public education system, it violates the concept of separation
of church and state." Although a bare five-member majority of the Mueller
Court found this argument unpersuasive, four of the Justices still abide by
the Nyquist-Sloan formula, noting in their dissent that direct or indirect "aid
to the educational function of [parochial schools] ... necessarily results in
aid to the sectarian enterprise as a whole." 2
In many ways the Mueller decision posited a new theory of church-state
relations. Instead of viewing their relationship as necessarily divisive, the
Court contended that "[a]t this point in the 20th century we are quite far
removed from the dangers that prompted the framers to include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights." In fact, the Court went so far as to
recognize that "the Minnesota legislature'S judgment that a deduction for educational expenses fairly equalizes the tax burden of its citizens and encourages desirable expenditures for educational purposes is entitled to substantial
2 Mueller, by rejecting the view that any aid scheme to private schools is tainted by the
pervasively sectarian nature of such schools, may prove important in two significant
issues not addressed by the Court. First, state efforts to provide private schools with
services or materials have frequently been found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
under the secular effect standard. These rulings concluded that religious indoctrination
was so central to these schools that the state could not aid the secular educational component of church-related schools without also aiding these schools' predominant religious
mission. Second, if the state sought to ensure that services or materials provided to private schools did not improperly advance religion, the aid program would generally be
found unconstitutional under the excessive entanglement standard. These holdings concluded that the state could only ensure that its program had a secular effect through
impermissible "comprehensive, discriminating and continued surveillance." The Mueller
Court's recognition of the positive secular role that private schools play in our educational system thus rebuts much of the "pervasively sectarian" doctrine of taint that
underlaid the invalidation of state efforts to provide materials or services to private
schools.
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deference." This represents a significant retreat from previous Establishment
Clause decisions, in that the Court upheld the Minnesota provision despite
the recognition that it was hard to distinguish between the economic effects
of th is statute and others that had in the past been rendered unconstitutional.
One explanation for this apparently drastic shift in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is the change in the Court's composition since the Nyquist-Sloan
"no aid" era. Justices William O. Douglas and Potter Stewart-both part of
the majority in the "no aid" era-have been replaced by John Paul Stevens
and Sandra Day O'Connor. Justice Stevens has sided with the old view and
Justice O'Connor with the new. In addition, Justice Lewis Powell, author of
the Nyquist opinion, has modified his position and now supports the new
view. Potentially more significant than even these shifts is the great possibility
th at a reelected President Reagan will appoint more Justices sympathetic to
the new view. Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan-both
stau nch "no aid" advocates-are considered by many Court analysts as being near retirement.
The immediate significance of Mueller v. Allen should not be overstated.
Though it represents a new approach to Establishment Clause analysis, the
Court was careful not to overrule any of its earlier decisions. Therefore most
programs that provide direct government assistance to private schools or indi rect assistance solely to parents of private school children might still be
unconstitutional. What Mueller does do is increase the likelihood that government can enact statutory provisions to provide a disproportionate benefit
to parents of private school children-so long as parents of public school
child ren can receive the same benefit through that provision. Outside the enactment of tax-deduction programs like the Minnesota plan, just what impact Mueller will have on state aid programs to private schools is hard to
gauge. On the one hand, aid schemes such as President Reagan's tuition taxcredit proposal are probably unconstitutional since they benefit only parents
of private school children. On the other hand, broad-based aid schemes like
vouchers that attempt to reshape the whole of American education might
very well be constitutional, since their benefits extend to all school children.
Mu eller, however, does indicate that the Justices might be more receptive
to government aid programs which benefit private schools. This is supported
by th e Court's recent decision in Lynch v. Donnelly, a case which upheld the
RhOde Island city of Pawtucket's inclusion of a Nativity Scene in its annual
Christmas display. As in Mueller, the Donnelly decision refused to utilize strict
Scrutiny standards in assessing the "religious effect" of the creche. Instead, the
CO urt noted that the "[Constitution] affirmatively mandates accommodation,
not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any." This
apparent trend of loosening Establishment Clause standards will soon be put
to another test in the private school context. The Supreme Court has recently
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agreed to hear the Grand Rapids v. Ball law suit. This case raises the signifi_
cant issue of "[w]hether it constitutes a per se violation of the establishment
clause to provide secular, supplementary, nonsubstitutionary instructional
services to part-time public school students on premises leased from religious_
ly-oriented nonpublic schools under conditions of public school control."
Despite the possibility that the Court's decision in the Grand Rapids case
might be favorable to private schools, Mueller might still serve as the impetus
for federal and state aid to private education. The National Catholic Educa_
tion Association, for example, has proposed that the Reagan tuition tax-credit
bill be modified to permit parents of public-school children to benefit from
the legislation. Additionally, legislators in Wisconsin and New Jersey have
recently introduced tax-deduction legislation similar to the Minnesota plan.
Yet in those states with high private school enrollments, little effort has been
made to mimic Minnesota. A recent study undertaken by the Washington
Post blamed the economy for this legislative inertia:
State taxes are going up while services are being trimmed, particularly in many
of the northeastern and midwestern industrial states-normally the most fe rtile
grounds for tuition tax benefits. The recession is particularly pressing urban
areas ... where blue-collar ethnic groups with a Roman Catholic heritage are
an important part of the political fabric and parochial school enrollments arc
high.
Another reason there hasn't been a strong legislative push in the states is that
most private-school lobbyists had been concentrating on the recently tabled
Reagan tuition tax-credit proposal. Once these groups begin to push for state
tax-deduction legislation, they can expect a fierce fight from both mainstream
public school groups (National Education Association, American Federation
of Teachers, and National School Board Association) and constitutional lobbyists (American Jewish Committee, American Civil Liberties Union. the
Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, and Americans United for Separation of Church and State). It might ultimately prove to be the case in
Mueller that while private school backers won the constitutional battle they
lost the war.

Private Discrimination and the Commonweal
The Bob Jones University decision reaffirms the Supreme Court's view that
racially discriminatory private schools are a detriment to American education. In 1973, the Court invalidated a Mississippi statute where textbooks
owned by the state were lent to both public- and private-school students
"without reference to whether any participating private schools has racially
discriminatory policies." In 1976, the Court held that section 1981 of the
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Civil Rights Act (the right to contract) meant nonsectarian private schools
could not deny admission to minority students.
Bob Jones University clearly establishes that the government may not provide any benefit-aside from police or fire protection-to racially discriminatory schools. The decision, written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, is replete
with language arguing that racially discriminatory private schools cannot
serve a public function: "[Thel legitimate education function [of such private schoolsl cannot be isolated from discriminatory practices . . . . [Oliscriminatory treatment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire educational
process." The Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education. "Therefore. educational institutions
guilty of racial discrimination cannot be considered 'beneficial and stabilizing
influ ences in community life.' "
So determined was the Court to establish the principle that racially discriminatory private schools arc not entitled to tax breaks that it gave short
shrift to the case's religious liberty issue. In Hoh Jones Vnil'ersity. the majority concluded that the governmental interest at stake "substantially outweighs
wh atever burden den ial of tax benefit places on lthe uni versi ty's 1 exercise of
[itsl religious beliefs," that interest being "denying public support to racial
discrimination in education." Yet, in determining that the Internal Revenue
Code requires tax-exempt institutions to conform with fundamcntal public
policy. the Court dcclined the opportunity to define a tax-exemption as govern ment aid. What the Court did wa'i elevate the governmental interest so it
could summarily dispo'ic of the case's rcligiou'i liberty issue.
The Boh Jones Vnil'crsity decision extends beyond privak schools with explicit policies of racial di<,crilllination. ]n llnll"llally sweeping language. the
Court defined the limit {)f public benefits: "Charitable exemptions arc justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit--a benefit
whi ch the society or the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which SUPPlemcnts and advanccs the work of public institutions already supported by tax rcvenues . . . . The institution's purpose must not be
so at odds with the cammon community conscience as to undcrminc any public benefit that might otherwisc be conferred." In other words. Boh Jones
Uni rersity grants the IRS ncar-plenary authority to dcny tax-exempt statm
to those private schools whose practices the I RS deems "at odds with the
com mon community conscience." Responding to this, Justice Lewis Powell
argu ed in his concurring opinion that the majority "ignores the important role
played by tax-exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply conflict ing, activities and viewpoints."
The principles of Bob Jones Unil'ersity also extend beyond the mere question of tax-exempt status. The decision can be interpreted to mean that anyone who receives government aid must conform to national public policy
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(apparently defined both by legislation and the "common community Con_
science"). The potential danger here was pointed out in papers filed before
the Court in Bob Jones University:
And what about the ... organizations themselves? Would they become subject
to myriad regulations and legal obligations .. . ? If so, retirement homes oper_
ated by particular religious charities might be forced to admit persons of any
creed; private schools or organizations for girls or boys might be forbidde n to
discriminate on the basis of age; community centers designed to serve particular
ethnic groups might have to open their doors to all comers; and any exempt
organization might be required to modify its physical facilities to provide access
to the handicapped.
Regarding tax-exempt private schools, the question remains what to do with
a school that is racially imbalanced due to factors unrelated to racial practices or beliefs. For instance, how should a private school whose classes are
taught in German, Chinese, Hebrew, or Swahili be treated? Additional factors, such as location, idiosyncratic curricula and procedures, and admiss ions
criteria based on religion, national origin, or measures of achievement may
also lead to racially imbalanced schools.
Nevertheless, despite the potential for extreme interpretation, mainstream
private-education groups supported the approach taken in the Bob Jones University decision. These private-school groups were concerned with the bad
publicity the tax-exemption issue was having on government efforts to aid
private education. The 1978 Moynihan -Packwood tuition tax-credit proposal
was partially stymied, for example, because of the Carter IRS's conclusion th at
existing racial nondiscrimination standards for tax-exempt private schoolsthe standard proposed by tuition tax -credit backers to ensure that partici pating schools did not discriminate- were inadequate. Similarly, the 1982 Re agan tuition tax-credit proposal was delayed in the Senate Finance Committee
until the Supreme Court ruled on Bob Jones University. That way, if the
Court decided that the nondiscrimination requirement was legally mandated,
existing IRS procedures could be lIsed to police schools that participate in
the proposed tuition tax-credit program. :l Consequently, the National Asso3 On November 16, 1983, Kansas Senator Robert Dole presented an amendment to the
Senate whieh specified a nondiscrimination requirement for President Reagan's proposed
tuition tax-credit legislation. Although inordinately complex (the Dole amendment takes
up close to three pages in the Congressional Record), this proposal is less comprehe nsive than existing procedures governing the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory
private schools. Under the Dole proposal, discri mination involves a specific act against
a specific individual. IRS procedures, on the other hand, also demand that a tax-exe mpt
institution formally adopt and a policy of racial nondiscrimination and advertise sllch
policy in a local newspaper of general circulation. IRS procedures also do not fo reclose the possibility of civil rights groups challenging the tax-exempt status of allegedly
discriminatory institutions. Contrary to this, the Dole proposal mandates that a school
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ciation of Independent Schools, hoping to establish better relationships between government and private education, made the following points before
the Court in Bob Jones University:
P rivate schools do believe that they are fully entitled to determine their own
ph ilosophy, to design the curriculum and choose the teaching materials and
methods they consider the most effective, and to admit students who they believe, and whose parents believe, will benefit from the education offered. But
they do not believe that race as a criterion for admission is one that is in accord with the public interest or the public policy.
The position taken by a minority of private schools . . . that there is a right
to discriminate on grounds of race, has been a thorn in the side of the private
school world as a whole for some time and we are hopeful that the Court will
settle the issue for once and for all.

In Bob JOlles Ulli!'ersity the Court granted these private school interests their
wish .

Who Qualifies for Help?
The Supreme Court's decisions in Boh Jones University and Mlleller did
not address the state regulation of private schools. This issue is of great and
im mediate concern, as Christian fundamentalists are currently pressing to
have state laws and regulations governing their schools declared unconstitutional on religious liberty grounds.
T he fundamentalists believe that the state is for the most part prohibited
from interfering with their schools. For them, the state's only legitimate interest lies in ensuring that every school provides its students with an adequate
education (reading, writing, computation) and satisfies reasonable fire, health,
and safety standards. The fundamentalists refuse to abide by other state regulations. Generally speaking, however, the states are unwilling to give up their
authority over the operation of nonpublic schools, believing that existing regUlations make educational sense. The states argue further that they are not
noticeably interfering with religious practices.
_ The Supreme Court has not yet resolved this issue. While its decisions sugbe denied participation in the tuition tax-credit program only if it is found racially discriminatory in a court action brought by the U.S. Attorney General.
Also on November 16, the Senate voted (59-38) to table the tuition tax-credit pro~osal. Not overriding in this decision, however, was the issue of tax credits providing
Indirect support to racial discriminatory private schools. Opponents of the tax-credit
~r?posal also made allegations concerning: (1) the costliness of tax credits; (2) tax credIts adVerse effect on public education; (3) the disproportionate benefit that tax credits
prOvide tC'l families who do not need economic assistance; and (4) that tax credits violate
t~e principle of separation of Church and State, since most private schools arc affiliated
WIth some church.
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gest that parents have a right to direct the upbringing of their children, it
also recognizes that the state may impose reasonable regulations governing
the operation of private schools. The line between reasonable and unreason_
able regulation and the significance of religious liberty concerns in making
that determination are questions still in need of Supreme Court resolution.
The decisions of those courts which have faced this issue are incredibly inconsistent. It therefore appears likely that the next significant Supreme Court
decision concerning the relationship between government and private educa_
tion will be on this issue.
Bah Jones University and Mueller did address the issue of how government
may aid private schools. Moreover, these decisions recognized the vital role
private schools play in the education of American youth. Mueller, more than
any other Court decision, legitimates the private education alternative through
its recognition of private education not only as a worthwhile provider of education but also as a boost to public education (though competition and the
reduction of taxes needed to support the public school system). In short,
Mueller says that private schools arc beneficial and the state has good reason
to support them. Bob Jones University complements Mueller by establish ing
parameters with in which the government may aid private schools; it forb ids
government from benefiting individual private schools guilty of racial discrimination. The decision aho permits the IRS and other executive agencies to
develop regulatory schemes that deny government benefits to private schools
whose policies are inconsistent with the principle of racial nondiscrimination
and othcr fundamental public policies. The general proposition advanced in
Mueller-that private schools are generally beneficent-is not contested in
Bah Jones University. Put simply: the Court approves of facially neutral government efforts to aid private schools whose practices are in conformity with
community standards.

Conlnl0nplace Book
The concept of a "wall" of separation hetween church and state is a liseful
metaphor bIlt is not an accllrate description of the practical aspects of the
relationship that in fact ('xists. The Constitution does not require complete
separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation,
not merely tolerance, of all reliRiollS. and forhids hostility toward any. Anything less would require the "callous indifference" . . . that was never intended by the Establishment Clause.
United States Supreme Court
LYllch, Mayor of Pawtllcket, v. Donnell." (Syllabus)
March 5, 1984

